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Abstract 
The rise of a transitions discourse in Dutch environmental policy is analysed. This 
new approach to environmental policy seeks radically more sustainable socio-
technical systems. As such, its agenda constitutes the latest twist in attempts at 
ecological modernisation, aiming to decouple economic growth from harmful 
environmental degradation. The coalescence and influence of a transitions discourse 
coalition, which has helped shape national environmental policy planning in recent 
years, is contextualised and analysed. Its limited success in institutionalising 
procedures for structural change in the energy domain suggests ecological 
modernisation remains elusive. 
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1. Introduction: ecological modernisation 
Dutch environmental policy has adopted a distinct new discourse. A ‘transitions 
approach’ is being institutionalised through the Fourth National Environmental Policy 
Plan (NMP4). This papers asks why the Dutch have adopted this new policy 
language, and with what practical effect upon environmental policy? Specifically, 
why did the Dutch approach to environmental policy, considered innovative in the 
late 1990s, need replacing with a new transition approach at the start of the twenty-
first century? 
 
This shift provides an important opportunity to analyse the roles discourse plays in 
policy development. Uncertainties and ambiguities pervade many environmental 
policy problems. Issues are characterised by incomplete (and disputed) ‘knowledges’ 
about complex causal processes, and contests over what the environmental problems 
mean for society, in terms of both consequences and trade offs (Hajer and Versteeg, 
2005; Dryzek, 1997). Discourse theory provides a frame for analysing how policy 
actors construct meanings around problems and act upon them. Discourses are drawn 
upon both in negotiating these meanings and in framing ways to proceed in problem 
solving. New policy discourses subsequently do not neutrally reflect environmental 
problems, but have a structural role in (re)constructing what they mean (Philips and 
Jørgensen, 2002). Discourse analysts argue that shifts in discourse, like that 
surrounding the new transitions approach, invariably attend radical policy 
development. 
 
Environmental problems come to be understood in diverse ways across cultures, 
social groups and over time. Consequently they are tackled in certain ways and not in 
others, in a process that is guided by subjective, evolving value systems. Moreover   2
commitment to certain solutions often drives policy change and associated shifts in 
discursive construction of the problems to be addressed.  In recent decades, for 
example, an ‘ecological modernisation’ discourse around the ecological crisis has 
emerged that competes with an older zero-sum ‘economy versus environment’ 
discourse. Ecological modernists reinterpret high-tech capitalism from environmental 
culprit into saviour. This discourse offers arguments and instances that suggest 
capitalism’s innovative zeal can profitably decouple economic growth from 
environmental degradation (koko – Mol, Spaargaren). A large scientific literature 
supports and debates these controversial ‘win-win’ ideas. They are then fed into 
policy thinking, as rhetorical resources for developing policy. Policy outcomes then 
return as evidence for further scientific investigation and critical debate. This is 
significant: science and policy continually and mutually construct this new discourse, 
but they also challenge it. (Jasanoff, 1990) 
 
Ecological modernist discourse manifests in policy institutions promoting 
environmental innovation (e.g. market-based instruments, win-win regulations, 
public-private-civic environmental partnerships) (Berkhout and Gouldson, 2003; 
Hajer, 1995). And yet, the effectiveness and possibility of ecological modernisation is 
disputed. People drawing upon competing discourses interpret its limited 
achievements more critically, and argue that capitalism’s need for growth remains 
culpable in environmental degradation (York and Rosa, 2003). Despite critical 
distinctions between ecological modernisation and sustainable development 
discourses (Langhelle, 2000), policy-making is more strongly embedded in the 
former, and policy makers routinely draw upon ecological modernist claims in their 
justifications. This paper does not enter this debate. Rather, we analyse the latest 
(transitions) approach by Dutch policy-makers to institutionalise ecological 
modernisation, whatever its attractions or short-comings. 
 
Dutch environmental policy is identified as pioneering ecological modernisation 
(Gouldson and Murphy, 1998; Weale, 1992; Hajer, 1995). The Netherlands was 
among the first countries to develop comprehensive environmental policy planning in 
partnership with business (NMP1 in 1989). This served as a model for other countries 
(Jänicke, Kunig et al. 2000: 115; Jänicke and Jörgens 1999: 179; Jörgens 2003: 15-
16). Then, in its fourth national plan in 2001 (NMP4), the Dutch government 
overhauled environmental planning with the new ‘transitions approach’. Progress 
under earlier plans, whilst positive, was considered insufficient for decoupling the 
economy from environmental degradation. As such, the transitions approach can be 
considered an attempt to reinvigorate the ecological modernisation discourse and 
move it from a weak to stronger version (Breukers and Wolsink, 2007). 
 
NMP4 commits the government to restructuring production and consumption systems 
over a generation (2030). New systems are envisaged which satisfy the needs of 
Dutch society using one-twentieth of the resources, and reducing emissions by a 
similar factor. This contrasts with incremental emission reductions and efficiency 
gains negotiated with industrial sectors in earlier plans. The new transitions discourse 
broadens the focus beyond firm-level processes of cleaner technology development. It 
refocuses on wider, linked processes that shape the social and technological systems 
satisfying our needs for energy, food, mobility, water, housing, and so on. Dutch 
researchers and policy-makers have been in the vanguard here. They advocate policy 
attention turning to processes for restructuring entire ‘socio-technical systems’ into   3
more sustainable forms (koko - Kemp and Rotmans; Geels, Elzen et al. 2004; koko - 
Hoogma et al). As we shall see, this research developed in close interaction with 
policy-makers, who currently fund a major transitions research programme. The 
‘transitions approach’ attracts considerable interest as a practice-oriented expression 
of these ideas (Kemp 1994; Berkhout 2002; Defra 2004; Jänicke 2004; Weber 2005). 
 
At the same time, policy-makers internationally are articulating a more systematic 
view of environmental challenges. The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development committed to a ten-year framework on sustainable production and 
consumption systems. An increasing number of governments, businesses and civil 
society groups are considering how reformed policy approaches might bring such 
systems into being, such as the ten-year ‘Marrakech process’ to implement World 
Summit on Sustainable Development commitments in this area.
1 The shift in Dutch 
discourse can, once again, be considered to be at the forefront of this discursive milieu 
or frontier. Their experience has wide relevance for policy initiatives and directions 
that may be pursued by other nations and international organisations. In particular, the 
case illustrates the difficulty of breaking away from incumbent, technology R&D 
focused strategies despite a discursive recognition of the need for structural change. 
 
The following section introduces the ‘discourse coalition framework’ (Hajer, 1995) 
used in the analysis. Section Three elaborates on the transitions discourse and its 
implications for policy. Section Four identifies how the opportunity for the shift in 
discourse opened, resulting from dissatisfaction with earlier national policy plans. 
That dissatisfaction was informed by research. It was at the research-policy interface 
(analysed in Section Five), that the transitions discourse coalition coalesced. Section 
Six considers why the government decided to adopt the discourse in NMP4. The 
implementation of the transitions approach is considered in Section Seven for the 
energy sector, which was the earliest and most enthusiastic adopter, and provides an 
early indication of ways in which it might shape institutions through discourse 
structuration. Section Eight draws conclusions about the degree to which the 
transitions approach has reinvigorated ecological modernisation, and uses this case to 
reflect upon the discourse coalition framework as a theoretical approach for analysing 
policy change. The material draws upon evidence from primary and secondary 
documentation, plus transcripts of 27 semi-structured interviews conducted between 
January and March 2006 with observers and participants in the relevant debates, 
negotiations and transitions.  
2. Analysing discourse coalitions 
Discursive approaches to analysing environmental policy have mushroomed (e.g. 
Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 7, 3, 2005). Our discourse analysis 
relies upon a framework developed by Marten Hajer (1995). Other analytical 
frameworks could be used for studying the rise of transition ideas into policy, such as 
‘advocacy coalitions’ (Sabatier, 1998), ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas, 1992), or 
‘agenda-setting streams’ (Kingdon, 1984). We chose to follow Hajer’s theoretical 
framework for three reasons.  
 
                                                 
1 http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/consumption/Marrakech/conprod10Y.htm (accessed 19 April 
2007).   4
Firstly, Hajer’s own framework was originally developed through an analysis of 
ecological modernisation in the Netherlands, and its institutionalisation in their 
national environmental policy plan in 1989 (NMP1). Applying Hajer’s framework to 
the latest twist in Dutch environmental policy provides an opportunity for further 
interrogation of the theory. It is particularly compelling that the transitions approach 
appears to be motivated by a desire to reinvigorate ecological modernisation, and 
even to take on a form similar to that advocated by Hajer at the end of his analysis 
(1995: 279).  
 
‘The challenge seems to be to think of an organization of ecological modernization as 
a process that allows for social change to take place democratically and in a way that 
stimulates the creation of an – at least partially – shared vision of the future … in 
finding new institutional arrangements in which different discourses (and concerns) 
can be meaningfully and productively related to one another, in finding ways to 
correct the prevailing bias towards economization and scientification, and in active 
intersubjective development of trust, acceptability, and credibility’ (Hajer, 1995: 280) 
 
In other words, where Hajer felt policy-makers had gone wrong, by being overly 
technocratic about ecological modernisation, they now appear to be making 
corrections: specifically through the creation of stakeholder arenas for envisioning 
and debating structural changes towards sustainable socio-technical systems. 
Analysing NMP4 allows further reflection upon the possibilities and conditions for a 
more ‘reflexive’ ecological modernisation. 
 
Second, Hajer’s framework links policy ideas with practices in a useful way for our 
research questions set out in the opening paragraph of Section One. He defines 
discourse ‘as a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are 
produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through 
which meaning is given to social and physical realities’ (1995: 44). New ideas, 
concepts and categories can be used to undermine and disrupt existing policy 
practices, and to generate and legitimise new approaches. Alternatively, working in 
the other direction, the way new ideas are adapted (or even corrupted) by prior, 
structurally embedded practices can substantially alter their meaning.  
 
On this latter point, Hajer considers ecological modernisation a ‘paradox’ (1995: 
267): governments argue that thoroughgoing structural change is necessary in 
economy-environment relations, but in practice they promote only selected, remedial 
measures. Ecological modernisation discourse is weakened through such practice and 
becomes susceptible to criticism. As with any discourse, the transitions approach will 
be ‘molded by institutional settings and through the application on particular cases’ 
(Hajer and Versteeg, 2005: 177). 
 
Prior institutions and interests are important. They are the product of past discursive 
interplay (Hajer calls this discourse structuration), and they provide the context in 
which new discourses emerge and are shaped (Rydin, 2003). There may be incidents 
or crises that undermine institutional legitimacy and force a rethink, opening up space 
for hitherto marginalised discourse. Historically informed analysis considers the 
contexts that bestow credibility upon certain discourses at some points, whilst 
rendering them fanciful at others, and their rise into dominance, or fall from favour. 
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Third, Hajer’s framework puts competing discourse coalitions centre stage in policy 
development. He avoids what critics see as a totalising impasse in more hegemonic 
understandings of discursive orders (Dryzek, 1997). Hajer considers Foucault to place 
too much ‘emphasis on the constraining workings of discourse’ and ‘is rather weak on 
the enabling aspect’ (Hajer, 1995: 49). The enabling aspect of this duality operates 
through competitions between coalitions of actors grouped together around distinct 
storylines. This suggests a plurality of discourses ‘that partly cover the same terrain, a 
terrain which each discourse competes to fill with meaning in its own way’ (Philips 
and Jorgensen, 2002: 141). Policy-makers draw upon and adapt discourses as a 
resource in their policy activities, but in so doing experience the structuring effects 
arising from the parameters within those discourses. 
 
Storylines bind discourse coalitions together. Storylines are powerful devices through 
which actors make sense of complex issues without recourse to comprehensive and 
cumbersome explanations. The coalition can be a fluid set of actors (individual and 
organisational) that share the usage of these storylines over a period. Whilst actors 
may come and go, it is the storyline that endures, and which is the focal unit of 
analysis. Actors need not hold identical meanings around the same storyline – indeed 
interpretive flexibility is essential for political coalition formation. Additionally, 
successful storylines hold discursive affinities with others, and thereby expand the 
population of actor interests committing to a discourse coalition. An example is the 
appeal ecological modernisation holds for business storylines around innovation and 
efficiency. Through time practice brings a dominant interpretation to bear on issues 
through efforts to institutionalise the discourse in question. 
 
‘[Ecological modernisation] has not happened because of sheer idealism on the part 
of the initiating actors, nor because of the strict rules set by the respective public 
authorities. It is the consequence, I would argue, of the socio-cognitive dynamics of 
the discourse-coalition that shaped up around eco-modernist storylines. The 
discursive power of ecological modernization manifests itself in the degree to which 
its implicit future scenarios permeate through society and actors reconceptualise 
their interests and recognize new opportunities and trouble spots’ (Hajer, 1995: 261) 
 
Actors may join coalitions with certain strategic or tactical goals in mind; 
nevertheless, by committing to a discourse actors sometimes reconsider those 
strategic interests. As with relations between institutions and discourse, there is a 
recursive relation between interests and discourse here, with Hajer preferring to take 
discourse as his point of departure, and seeing actors realising
2 their interests through 
discourse. Similarly, actors seek strategically to co-opt and neuter a threatening 
discourse in the ascendant through tactics such as rhetoric, ridiculing aspects of an 
argument, undermining other actors’ positions by exposing them as ideologically 
driven or self-serving, inserting elements of other story lines. All these are used to 
shape the debate and try and influence policy. This is where Hajer goes against 
Foucault – people are not trapped in the discourses, but cleverly draw upon and 
manipulate them as a resource for attaining policy supremacy (Ockwell and Rydin, 
2006). 
 
                                                 
2 The term ‘realise’ is intended in both senses here: to come to understand ones interests; and to try and 
fulfil those interests (after Byrne, 1998).   6
Emblematic issues play a key role in typifying storylines, and provide a focus around 
which coalitions compete most vigorously. Ecological modernisation is rarely 
considered in its full complexity. Emblems such as ‘acid rain’, ‘climate change’, 
‘clean production’ or ‘resource efficiency’ become more amenable proxies for 
understanding. The transitions discourse appears novel because its emblematic issue 
is not so much an environmental problem so much as a process for solving multiple 
problems. The goal of transforming socio-technical systems into more sustainable 
forms is approximated through evocation of an ‘S’-shaped curve. Goal-oriented 
‘sustainability visions’ form the destination for the top of the transformation curve. 
Transitions discourse actors repeatedly state the need to promote learning and 
innovation as part of these processes. It is this procedural emblem that provides a 
storyline about how transitions progress. 
 
Historical research into the transformation of systems in energy, transport, sanitation 
and food, suggests that radical, systems-level change begins with the emergence of 
alternative practices in niche settings (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels, 2002). Over time 
some of these develop, grow, and attract wider support; practitioners and their ideas 
become more influential upon their socio-economic contexts. Opportunities for 
growth are greatest when Kuhnian contradictions in the incumbent system are placing 
it under considerable stress. The old system shows weaknesses and repeatedly fails to 
offer satisfying answers to the questions people want to ask, a competing niche 
emerges offering a fresh understanding, new ways of framing questions and a set of 
alternative practices pressing for change.  
 
By creating policies that support niche experiments in sustainability, whilst other 
policies place incumbent systems under concerted pressure to become sustainable, the 
transitions approach seeks to facilitate the transformation of systems (Smith et al, 
2005). The ‘S’-curve moves from the niche ‘pre-development’ phase, through ‘take 
off’, along an ‘acceleration’ phase, and culminates in ‘stabilisation’ around the new 
structure of sustainable socio-technical practices (Rotmans et al, 2001). Elaborations 
upon this storyline have intrigued and attracted many to the transitions discourse. It 
appears radical, whilst echoing conventional marketing understandings around the 
adoption of new products (and social scientific ideas about scientific change). The 
discourse coalition framework would suggest that actors coalescing around this 
transitions storyline led to the shift in Dutch environmental policy. However, it is 
interpretation and institutionalisation of transition discourse, practice and outcomes 
that is the final arbiter of its meaning.  
3. The Dutch transitions discourse 
The transitions discourse was articulated through close interaction between 
researchers and policy-makers. As we shall see, the institutionalisation of this 
discourse into policy has heightened rather than closed debate. This reveals the 
flexibility of the original storyline, and how this permits influence whilst 
simultaneously making it susceptible to capture. Critics argue the radical edge of the 
discourse has been blunted: structural goals, they argue, have been eclipsed (once 
again) by technocratic reforms (see below). 
 
The transitions storyline has three basic elements. First, it invokes the generational 
goal of steering Dutch society towards socially envisioned sustainable systems, whose 
resource use and emissions are radically lower than systems today. Second, transitions   7
towards these visions can be the subjects of social experiments, and promoted 
practically through sustainability niches, whose successful development into systems 
follows the ‘S’-curve trajectory.  Finally, transitions require learning processes and 
policy pressure upon incumbents in order to transmit improved niche practices into 
the mainstream (socio-technical change). Innovation is essential to the transitions 
discourse. The storyline adopts an evolutionary stance towards structural change, 
seeking social processes for consciously guiding the trajectory of development in 
more sustainable directions. 
 
Other policy discourses share aspects of the transitions discourse, indeed many have 
informed it. The transitions discourse appeals because it combines aspects like ‘long-
term visions’, ‘policy learning’, and ‘adaptive governance’ into a strategic framework 
based around the ‘S’-curve storyline. As such, it offers the prospect of reinvigorating 
ecological modernisation without challenging cherished components. Thus, market-
based instruments and win-win regulations, both advocated within ecological 
modernist discourse, remain key policy tools amongst a portfolio that can help guide 
transitions. The power of innovation to decouple environmental degradation from 
economic growth remains as a foundation. The dominant ecological modernisation 
discourse is repackaged in the transitions approach. 
 
Whilst the discourse suggests a process for realising sustainable systems, it does not 
impose a particular view. Similarly, Hajer does not suggest what a more radical, 
reflexive ecological modernisation would mean in terms of specific goals. Rather it is 
the process for debating this meaning that he holds to be important. A reflexive 
ecological modernisation institutionalises processes for deliberate social choice 
between alternative scenarios of development. Scenarios are considered a point at 
which contrasting perspectives can meet and seek productive integration. What is 
intriguing about the transitions approach is that it proposes policy institutions along 
these lines: multi-stakeholder civic arenas for debating and progressing transitions to 
sustainable socio-technical systems; practical niche experiments for exploring 
potentials; institutions that promote social learning, supportive policy development 
and innovation. 
 
However, Meadowcroft strikes a cautionary note: 
 
‘To commentators outside the Netherlands the approach can appear hopelessly 
unrealistic. Even in a country known for its consensus-oriented political system and 
strong traditions of planning and environmental policy innovation, one can wonder 
whether actors with divergent economic interests (for example, firms representing 
rival technological approaches) can be expected to agree on pathways of socio-
technical change, and whether the political system can be expected to provide a 
sufficiently stable context to orient transitions that may last decades’ (Meadowcroft 
2005: 487; also Berkhout et al, 2005). 
 
Does the transitions discourse in NMP4 really herald a reinvigorated ecological 
modernisation?   8
4. Difficulties in Dutch National Environmental Policy Planning 
The discourse coalition framework (Section Two) considers interactions between 
discourse formation, its institutional context, and coalition building. Discourses can 
prompt reappraisals of what contexts mean, whilst contexts influence the credibility of 
discourses and coalition formation. The transition discourse developed at a time of 
growing dissatisfaction with earlier national environmental policy plans. But it did not 
simply respond to that unease. The transitions discourse also contributed to it, through 
policy-oriented research that reconsidered sustainable innovation in more systematic 
terms, and that begged questions of the existing policy approach. This section 
documents the dissatisfaction in Dutch environmental planning, and the following 
section discusses the research-policy interface. 
 
Published in 2001, NMP4 presented ‘a new policy cycle’ (VROM, 2001: 78) to 
complement earlier series of national environmental plans, beginning with NMP1 in 
1989. Strategic planning has deep roots in the Netherlands, as does a consensual 
approach to stakeholder involvement (Weale 1992; Hajer, 1995). The ‘capacity of 
government to develop and apply strategic plans at the national level has evolved over 
a considerable period of time’ (Gouldson and Murphy 1998: 105).  
 
National environmental plans are led by the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning 
and the Environment (VROM). The first national environmental plan (NMP1) was 
innovative for a number of reasons (Weale, 1992). First, thanks to the ‘intellectual 
stimulus and diplomatic leadership’ of environment minister Pieter Winsemius 
(Weale 1992: 139), NMP1 enjoyed cross-ministerial endorsement. Second, it took a 
long-term and comprehensive perspective (with targets to 2010). Third, it considered 
environmental functions essential to Dutch society. Fourth, it sought four- to ten-fold 
improvements in environmental performance, and established quantitative targets for 
key industrial sectors. Fifth, these long-term targets were negotiated in partnership 
with industry (Keijzers 2000; Krarup and Ramesohl 2000; Oudshoff and 
Klinckenberg 2003). Sixth, partnerships were also sought with civil society. 
Subsequent national plans, issued in 1993 and 1998, reinforced this framework, and 
focused upon implementation (NMP 2 and 3). 
 
Many commentators applauded this co-operative, long-term approach. The plans were 
considered to institutionalise ecological modernisation discourse through 
commitments to integrate economic and environmental activity (Weale, 1992; 
Gouldson and Murphy, 1998; Keijzers, 2000). Others were disappointed. The plans 
interpreted ecological modernisation technocratically. They did not debate publicly 
the sustainable renewal of industrial society (Hajer, 1995). The plans were weakened 
by compromises within government and with business that translated into relatively 
undemanding targets. Partnerships with civil society were, in practice, absent. VROM 
later acknowledged, ‘in retrospect, the impression is that the stakes could have been 
set higher’ (VROM 2001: 9). 
 
According to Hajer, a fatal discursive disjuncture lay at the heart of NMP1. The plan 
acknowledged the severity of environmental pressures, and admitted deep structural 
causes lying in industrial society. But the targets, whilst demanding from a business 
perspective, fell short of addressing structural change. Government acknowledged this 
discrepancy, but argued pragmatically that NMP1 was the only way to ensure 
everyone (including business) took responsibility for the environment (Hajer, 1995:   9
250). The more structural components of the ecological modernisation storyline were 
not the basis for coalition growth. More dominant storylines around economic 
performance and international competitiveness, embodied within the more powerful 
policy-making institutions of government, trimmed ecological modernisation to a 
series of incremental reforms. 
 
Subsequent policy evaluations confirmed the disjuncture (VROM 1998: 18-22). Even 
where industry had successfully met targets, these relative improvements could not 
compensate for environmental pressures associated with absolute growth in the Dutch 
economy. Significant advances (e.g. in terms of cleaner production) were not breaking 
the stubborn link between economic growth and environmental degradation (VROM 
1998: 18-22). The Dutch economy was experiencing strong growth in the late 1990s.
3 
 
Evaluations strengthened the position of those arguing for new approaches with 
deeper solutions. Gerard Keijzers, former head of the Directorate of Strategy and Plan 
Development at VROM (1990 to 1999), argued a new way forward was needed ‘if 
real reductions in per capita levels of demand for energy and in claims on resource 
stocks and biodiversity are to be achieved’ (2000: 191). Environmental policy was 
insufficient to really change the social and economic drivers of the problem, and 
‘handling these dominant challenges will demand both changes in social behaviour 
(consumption patterns) and technological regime shifts’ (ibid). In the late 1990s, 
VROM was being led at the time by Minister Pronk who, like Winsemius before, and 
once persuaded by the transitions coalition, was considered to provide the visionary 
leadership to nurture this space within government (interviews 15 and 18).  
 
Discussions around science & technology in NMP3 reveal how policy-makers were 
already signalling an appetite for new ideas.NMP3 argued ‘more radical innovation is 
possible by developing new systems which fulfil the functions of existing systems 
more efficiently’ (VROM 1998: 246). NMP3 called for policy that ‘must not be 
confined to the development of new technology and technological products, [but] 
must also be directed towards the interrelationship between demand pull and 
technology push’ (VROM 1998: 246-247). The language moves away from an 
incremental approach, and begins to contemplate its more systemic and structural 
dimensions.  
 
However, NMP3 continued to frame innovation within a neo-classical economic 
framework - ‘a well functioning market in technological research will automatically 
lead to innovation’ (VROM 1998: 247) - whereas the transition approach, based in 
evolutionary economics, considers innovation to involve more institutionally 
complex, distributed processes of variation, selection and adaptation that is far from 
‘automatic’ (Bergh et al. 2006). Even so, NMP3 opened discursive space for a more 
radical ecological modernisation.  
 
In NMP4 the Dutch government formally endorsed the transitions discourse. It 
continued to identify ‘system faults in the current social order’ (VROM 2001: 11), but 
sought transitions that ‘take on the form of a long drawn-out transformation process 
comprising technological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional changes’ 
                                                 
3 GDP growth averaged four per cent (before slowing down considerably in 2001-05, picking up to 
nearly three per cent today).   10
(VROM 2001: 30). The language and institutions across Dutch government must, 
according to NMP4, be reconfigured to permit transitions policy. NMP4 was signed 
by nine ministries. However, whilst endorsing a transitions approach, NMP4 
remained thin on detail, and included more conventional policies alongside its 
commitment to the new framework. As we shall see, one of the discursive strengths of 
the transitions approach is that it accommodates prior policy positions, like market-
based instruments, technology subsidies, and regulations, within its broad framework. 
In practice, NMP4 was a point of endorsement for a discourse coalition already 
developing a transition policy model. 
5. Coalition formation: the transitions research-policy interface 
Since the 1970s the Netherlands has invested considerable research capacity in 
studying relations between technology, society and innovation. Many Dutch 
universities have technology studies departments that enjoy good research links with 
government in a densely connected polity. This research community has attended 
repeatedly to environmental issues, and helped develop a sophisticated repertoire of 
policy tools. Several environment-technology research programmes in the 1990s
4 
provided a context for further dialogue between research and policy communities 
(Vergargt, 2005). It was through these dialogues that a series of ideas about 
technology and sustainability were developed and carried by a small network of 
actors, and that would eventually crystallise around a transitions storyline. This 
dialogue and networking provided NMP4 with the new direction being sought by 
environmental policy-makers at that time. 
 
Most research under these programmes worked within conventional, reform-minded 
frameworks of eco-efficiency. Nevertheless, a small network of individuals was 
reaching conclusions that suggested a broader, systems perspective was needed. The 
network shared a number of ideas. It considered prospects for sustainable 
technological practices into the long-term (over a generation - 20 years). The potential 
for radical (e.g. twenty-fold) improvements in resource efficiency and emissions 
reduction were being explored. There was an awareness of the important social 
processes shaping technology development and use. A ‘socio-technical’ perspective 
emerged, attending to the way institutions, markets, culture, social values, material 
interests, as well as the technological artefacts themselves, were critical in the mutual 
co-development of sustainable practices. Experiments with scenario building and 
‘back-casting techniques’ (Quist, 2007) convinced this network that articulating long-
term sustainability visions provided an important compass for instituting systematic 
changes, plotting potential pathways, and encouraging social learning.  
 
These were themes ‘in the air’ at the time, and were drawn together in the transitions 
approach (Vergragt, 2005). The developing transitions storyline was supported by 
emerging historical research into past technological transitions that had widespread 
social underpinnings and ramifications (e.g. sail power to steam ships) (Geels, 2002). 
These historical case studies conceptualised three interconnected processes by which 
the socio-technical system undergoes change (innovative niches, internal 
contradictions in the incumbent system, and socio-economic ‘landscape’ pressures 
                                                 
4 These were the Duurzame Technologische Ontwikkeling (DTO, 1993 to 1997), the TNO ’81 options 
project (1997), the Nationaal Initiatief Duurzame Ontwikkeling (NIDO, 1996-2002), and the Economie, 
Ecologie, Technologie (EET, 1996-2002). 
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deriving outside the system but bearing upon it) (Rip and Kemp, 1998). Other 
applications of the model included transitions in domains like agriculture, energy, 
transport, manufacturing, entertainment, and sanitation. Here was a storyline that 
could generate compelling policy stories about all sorts of change. 
 
The loose network of twenty or so people interested in these emerging transition ideas 
included policy-makers from the environment ministry, the economic ministry, and 
researchers from universities and government research institutes. Researchers and 
policy-makers in particular projects may have been working in different domains of 
practice, such as energy, agriculture, housing, or transport, but programme-level 
activities facilitated dialogue across domains. 
 
Follow-up initiatives
5 specifically attempted to deepen participation from the business 
community. Intriguingly, successful engagement was felt to demand a shorter-term 
orientation relating to modifications in business practice (e.g. environmental 
management) rather than systems innovation. Participatory envisioning processes and 
back-casting techniques were not considered sufficiently meaningful or enticing. 
According to one participant, they were ‘uninteresting for businesses … they 
wouldn’t invest in that kind of processes’ (interview 9). This narrowing of focus 
anticipates the institutionalisation of transitions discourse, and appears to repeat the 
pattern identified in the institutionalisation of ecological modernisation in NMP1. 
 
Nevertheless, the network of researchers and policy-makers seeking systems changes 
persisted in their advocacy. A researcher participant recalled:  
 
‘There was a policy network of individuals and civil servants in favour of those ideas, 
bridging the science and policy sphere because they were involved in both and could 
translate ideas and had some credibility and also some business relationships. This 
network emerged out of those programmes’ (interview 2). 
 
The big opportunity for the transitions coalition was provided by an interdepartmental 
working group, charged by the environment and economy ministers to prepare NMP4. 
The role of innovation in sustainable development formed an obvious bridge between 
economic and environmental ministerial agendas. Some working group members had 
either been involved, or were familiar with, the research programmes in which 
transitions ideas had been aired. 
 
Ideas for radical, system level change were slowly percolating into policy narratives. 
A senior civil servant at the economic ministry argued, ‘the learning processes with 
[the research programmes] were necessary preliminary steps for a transitions 
approach’ (interview 15). There was dissatisfaction with the existing approach 
(NMP1-3), and ‘people from within the government were looking to the outside for 
new concepts’ (interview 7). Two studies were commissioned by the NMP4 working 
group that crystallised the emerging transitions discourse. The first study made the 
case for a transitions approach, whilst the second study put this on a firmer conceptual 
and practical footing. 
 
                                                 
5 In the NIDO programme.   12
The second, influential study was done by a team from the University of Maastricht 
(ICIS-MERIT
6 led by Jan Rotmans, expert in systems modelling climate-society 
interactions, and René Kemp, expert in innovation and environmental policy). Their 
report describes transitions as long-term fundamental structural change processes in 
societal subsystems, and proposed a model of how such processes could be directed 
by policy (Rotmans et al, 2001). Their inchoate model took energy as an emblematic 
case (the economic ministry is responsible for energy policy). In retrospect, this report 
had a crucial importance for getting preliminary ideas around transition management 
into NMP4: parts of the plan reproduced verbatim sections from the ICIS-MERIT 
report (Kemp and Loorbach 2005: 129). 
 
Interviewees repeatedly recall the outcome of the process as far from predetermined. 
The transition approach was a discourse that gradually emerged within research-
policy networks (Kemp and Loorbach 2005: 129). One author described a series of 
meetings with ‘a lot of confusion, a lot of ideas, a lot of discussion, a highly iterative 
and interactive process during which the concepts co-evolved. This was not a goal 
oriented or planned process’ (interview 17). And yet there was a goal – promoting an 
‘S’-curve of sustainable structural changes to socio-technical systems. The report and 
associated discussions drew on various ideas from earlier research-policy programmes 
that were already in the air, being discussed, counter-posed, integrated, mutually 
adapted, and so on. A storyline was being fleshed out that suited the purposes of the 
working group and had a credibility brought from the research community. 
 
A senior civil servant said, ‘Rotmans deserves credit for inventing transition 
management and bringing it to policy makers but the learning processes with [earlier 
programmes] were necessary preliminary steps for a transitions approach’ (interview 
15). The team were ‘people who had the right words, pointing towards new directions 
… who also had the authority and the communicative skills to affect others’ 
(interview 7). However, the ICIS-MERIT team considered themselves to have been 
responding to a ‘transitions’ agenda initiated by government, and their report refers to 
ideas and reports emerging from other programmes. In effect, the ICIS-MERIT report 
‘merely’ succeeded in pulling together various research and policy threads already 
current in research-policy dialogues, and adapted them into a more coherent and 
persuasive storyline. Affinities between actor stories were being actively sought and 
constructed. However, whilst the various groups, reports and projects were weaving a 
transitions storyline, it remained a discourse coalition that still had to impact upon 
policy. Ideas exploring a reinvigorated Dutch environmental policy had to lead to 
policy commitment. These came with publication of NMP4 itself. 
6. The policy shift: adopting the transitions discourse 
Unsurprisingly, not everyone in the ministries was convinced by the transitions 
discourse. Those pushing the transitions storyline were careful to present it as 
extending rather than undermining existing policy commitments. Reputations were 
riding on both, and those developing the transitions ideas knew it. The discourse 
coalition had to be accommodating. As one of the ICIS-MERIT team explained: 
 
                                                 
6 MERIT – Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology; ICIS – 
International Centre for Integrated Assessment and Sustainable Development.   13
‘[we] helped to overcome one of the big threats of the project: that TM [transition 
management – the transitions approach] could be perceived as a complete policy 
change. We were very careful in saying that this is a framework for policy thinking 
for things beyond the usual policies, not as a replacement, which took away some of 
the concerns’ (interview 20).  
 
This helped further recruitment to the discourse coalition. Within VROM, the 
transitions approach presented a way of reinvigorating environmental policy without 
having to dismantle or radically reconfigure existing legislation. Existing policy 
instruments were an assuring part of moving along the ‘S’-curve: though the evidence 
undermining earlier NMP approaches suggests they were failing to do so. Something 
extra was needed, which was the promise of the transitions approach. 
 
Transitions provided existing instruments a more integrated, longer-term framework 
for future development. This was persuasive for those charged with presenting the 
new policy ideas for ministerial approval. The recollection of one senior policy-maker 
at VROM is: 
 
‘Rotmans came in with a presentation on transition management and that fitted in 
very well with our needs…It was a lucky coincidence that the need for a new concept 
came together with the supply of one’ (interview 24) 
 
The connection, however, was a ‘coincidence’ carefully developed through the 
discourse coalition. The transitions storyline had been crafted through extensive 
dialogue, drawing upon long-standing research-policy engagement, and an 
entrepreneurial understanding nurtured by policy workshops that tested and adapted 
the key ideas. 
 
Amongst the needs addressed by the transition coalition was an approach which 
would work with other ministries. In practice, non-environmental ministries were not 
all living up to their end of the NMP bargain, and continued to defend the sectional 
interests that constituted their policy networks. The big break-through with the 
transitions storyline was that working groups championing it included those with an 
inside track in the influential economics ministry (EZ). 
 
Sections within EZ found the transitions storyline appealing for several reasons. First, 
it spoke to EZ responsibilities for both innovation policy and energy policy. In energy 
policy, traditional corporatist modes of governing energy were being disrupted 
massively by European liberalisation of energy markets, beginning in 1998. EZ was 
coming to terms with the deep ramifications of low carbon policy commitments 
precisely at the moment when influence over the energy system was giving way to the 
market.  
 
The transitions approach suggested new governance mechanisms that might better fit 
the new liberalised energy system. An EZ civil servant involved in the transitions 
discours coalition acknowledged, ‘in EZ [the ministry] the big thing in energy is 
market liberalisation so we have to connect with that. If we don’t do that we will 
always remain a sideshow (interview 12). And yet liberalisation has shortened 
perspectives in the sector, in terms of R&D, investments, reserve capacity, and   14
management of resources, precisely at the time when the transition approach is trying 
to institute a longer-term, sustainability perspective (see Section Seven). 
 
Second, transitions appeared accordant with EZ innovation policy. Some in the 
ministry were persuaded (rhetorically, at least) that a more sophisticated approach to 
sustainable innovation might attract international R&D capital to the Netherlands. 
This chimed with a self-image of the Netherlands as a knowledge intensive economy 
and important nodal site for global innovation networks. EZ accepted environmental 
problems were persistent and that issues like climate change needed system 
innovations. The transitions approach connoted a ‘sense of opportunity’ for Dutch 
business (interview 1, Bruggink 2005: 10-11, EZ 2004a: 9). 
 
In other words, the transitions storyline reinforced the economic promise of ecological 
modernisation. EZ was persuaded the transitions discourse could help it convince 
business too. Transition ideas resonated with more dominant policy commitments 
towards the knowledge economy and international competitiveness under the EU 
Lisbon agenda: sustainable niches turning into mass markets; structural changes 
through evolution rather than revolution; the emphasis on innovation and attracting 
international R&D; and a reduced, enabling government seeking ways to work more 
productively with business. Here was an environmental policy approach that EZ could 
internalize. Elements in EZ championed the transitions discourse and were soon 
driving its dissemination internally and amongst other ministries. They were assisted 
by civil servants from other ministries already involved in the discourse coalition, and 
whose voice was facilitated by failures in conventional policy in their own ministries, 
notably agriculture and transport. 
 
NMP4 needed approval amongst ministers from nine ministries. The transitions 
storyline provided a framework within which each could work, or, at least not feel 
threatened. A large part of its appeal has been the way it provides a procedural 
framework for systems change, but without specifying the policy goal. The ‘S’-curve 
model can be applied at multiple scales and fleshed out in a variety of domains. As 
such, the discourse allowed ministries to continue pursuing their own agendas within 
the overall approach. Politically as well, it appealed across the spectrum, since it 
appeared market-friendly whilst seeking progressive aims. This was particularly 
important for the Kok coalition government at the time, consisting of the social 
democratic party (PvdA), the liberal party (VVD) and the social liberal democrats 
(D66). Initial lack of enthusiasm amongst ministers leading VROM (Jan Pronk, 
PvdA) and EZ (Annemarie Jorritsma, VVD) was turned to willing approval when 
they realised the personal political capital attainable through championing a measure 
that could succeed across government. The government agreed NMP4 in 2001 and 
adopted the transitions approach. 
 
In sum, the transitions storyline provided a suite of elements that policy-makers could 
latch on to. A successful coalition built because the transitions approach contained 
considerable interpretative flexibility. But it also appeared modular. It was not a 
single instrument or tight package. Different constituencies could major on elements 
that suited their policy agendas and networks. Transitions could mean, by turns, long-
term envisioning amongst stakeholders, supporting niche innovations, creating new 
partnerships with business, reducing state involvement, or simply providing a new   15
language for defending existing policy instruments. In terms of coalition formation, 
the storyline’s strength was its susceptibility to deconstruction and co-option.  
 
Of course, this is not what those developing the storyline originally intended. To 
them, the strength of the storyline was its overall coherence and strategic aim. The 
result was that a reinvigorated, potentially radical ecological modernisation hung in 
the balance, and depended upon the way the transitions discourse became 
institutionalised in policy practices. 
7. Discourse structuration? The Dutch energietransitie 
The energy policy domain has been the first and most vigorous to institutionalise the 
transitions approach. EZ considered itself to be the ‘initiator, trailblazer and leader of 
the energy transition in the Netherlands’ (EZ 2004b: 1). They seek 40 to 60 per cent 
cuts in carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 (VROM, 2001: 33). 
Institutionalisation of the transitions discourse in the energy domain is generating 
considerable debate about what the approach really means in practice. The focus to 
date has been on trying to establish sustainability experiments (niches). Critics 
consider this to be fairly conventional innovation policy, rather than part of a 
concerted attempt to seed structural change in energy systems. Even so, it is 
innovation re-interpreted through transitions discourse, whose institutionalisation 
encourages continuing debate and policy learning. 
 
At the heart of energy transition (ET) institutionalisation are six transition platforms. 
Stakeholders have come together under these platforms and developed transition 
themes and ambitious goals for 2020; they are developing pathways towards those 
goals; and they suggest transition experiments that could help move sections of the 
Dutch energy system along those pathways, as well as considering suggestions from 
others (Oudshoff and Klinckenberg 2003; VROM 2003; EZ 2004a). The first 
experiments began in 2005. Table 1 provides an overview of the platforms, pathways 





In convening the platforms, EZ turned to its established energy policy networks. They 
appointed business representatives as chairs for all platforms, who then identified 
other interested stakeholders. The composition of the platforms (Table 2) reveals 
business to be the dominant actor group. The only environmental NGO actively 
involved is Stichting Natuur en Milieu (SNM, Society for Nature and Environment). 




Subsequently, the government has created an ET taskforce to oversee and coordinate 
the work of the platforms. It consists of 17 individuals, mainly from industry and the 
public sector, and is chaired by Rein Willems (CEO Shell Netherlands). 
Representatives from large energy companies feature prominently in the taskforce - 
Shell, Essent, Electrabel and Gasunie. The taskforce is ‘intended to strengthen the role 
of the platforms and to determine which technological spearheads offer the best   16
prospects for the Netherlands’ (EZ 2005: 30). Their action plan, published in May 
2006, attracted considerable publicity (TaskforceEnergytransition, 2006).  
 
Those in EZ responsible for ET have sought to complement this external political 
reinforcement with a reorganization of policy internally. An interdepartmental 
directorate for the energy transition (IPE) has been created, whose 30 civil servants 
are drawn from six ministries. Their task is to improve the ‘fit between ongoing 
policy dossiers and policy conditions for system innovations over the longer term’ 
(EZ 2005: 52). An EZ civil servant suggests this initiative came from ET stakeholders 
who ‘developed pressure on government to re-organise policies and combine them’ 
(interview 24). 
 
Progressively larger sums of public money for energy R&D are being distributed 
through the ET platforms, boosted by private investment from business participants in 
the transition experiments. Whilst the ET taskforce calls for annual spending of €2 
billion, levels at the moment run into the low hundreds of millions. Nevertheless, in 
terms of energy R&D policy, it is clear that the transitions approach is steering the 
commitments being made. EZ takes the final decision on experiments proposed by the 
business-led platforms. Decisions are taken on conventional, ‘near market’ criteria for 
technology development projects. These include the costs and benefits of the 
‘experiment’, likelihood of business investment, strength of demand, and a good 
chance of the experiment meeting with success. 
 
Both the business consortia proposing transition experiments, and subsequent EZ 
decisions, are following a pattern heavily influenced by existing institutions for 
technology R&D. The transitions discourse is being practised through technocratic 
means and, as such, any connotations of broad-based civic dialogue around re-ordered 
socio-economic priorities are being lost to more narrow pursuits of technology-fixes. 
There is little evidence yet that the ET is exerting a strong influence over energy 
policy beyond R&D. Neither market-based instruments nor regulations are being 
instituted with the express purpose of pressing for a transition. Discursive components 
that argue incumbent systems must be placed under concerted pressure to restructure 
(thereby complementing niche building efforts) are not reconfiguring energy 
institutions. This would involve the IPE in confrontations with some powerfully 
entrenched interests in government and business (e.g. the Netherlands is a major gas 
and petrochemical economy). The transitions storyline is not gaining ground on more 
entrenched discourses around energy liberalization and the international 
competitiveness of key economic sectors. The imperatives of political economy are 
proving, once again, to be strongly filtering the heavier demands of ecological 
modernisation. 
 
However, from the perspective of transitions champions within EZ, it is essential that 
the energy sector and wider ministry accept the new policy approach. As with NMP1, 
policy-makers have had to be pragmatic in the demands they made. The challenge 
ahead is for this shallow institutionalisation to deepen, extend and really overturn 
entrenched cognitive routines, and redirect private sector investment and business 
models. Participants are under pressure to deliver successful projects in the short-term 
in order to justify the transitions approach. This reinforces narrow and technocratic 
institutionalisation. There is an emphasis on supply-side technology products rather 
than overall social practices around sustainable energy.   17
 
Researchers instrumental in establishing a transitions discourse coalition, as well as 
some of the leading policy-makers, have become critical of its institutionalisation. 
They see the approach simplified and turned into crude instruments by consultants 
and civil servants. One of the ICIS-MERIT team argues the ET taskforce consists of 
‘people from the [energy] regime who try to control the process. They are interfering 
[with the process], kill the space and obstruct radical change more or less consciously’ 
(interview 17). Social dialogue is thin, dominated by incumbent business interests, 
and too technocratic in its framing. The imminent creation of a carbon capture and 
storage working group with little public debate is, according to one NGO 
representative, ‘just an illustration of the total corruption of the transition by the 
vested interests’ (interview 13).  
 
The interpretive flexibilities valuable for recruitment to the discourse coalition 
simultaneously undermine its influence by permitting very elastic uses of the 
language. Institutionalisation has to solidify the meaning, and, in the absence of a 
power base for structural change, it has to do so pragmatically; but in so doing it 
fragments the original discourse coalition. Fortunately, amongst the institutions 
created are opportunities for dialogue, such as a transitions competence centre, that 
will permit continued learning and debate between the research and policy 
community. And the openness of transitions processes suggests a susceptibility to 
critical engagement from civil society, if this becomes sufficiently strong and 
concerted. So whilst this attempt to reinvigorate ecological modernisation is faltering, 
it is remains open to renewed attempts in the future. 
8. Conclusions 
In analysing the transitions approach, we wished to see to what extent its 
institutionalisation is reinvigorating the ecological modernisation of the Netherlands. 
The case also provides an opportunity to reflect upon Hajer’s discourse coalition 
framework for analysing policy change. 
 
The analysis finds a transitions discourse coalition that did not simply fill an 
opportunity for policy renewal with a ready-made alternative. The coalition emerged 
from a research-policy interface, whose research into environmental innovation, and 
whose evaluations of earlier policies, were feeding a dissatisfaction and appetite for 
policy change. Ideas moving around this coalition were leading to a suite of new 
policy suggestions. Jan Rotmans and colleagues were clever at negotiating these into 
a coherent transitions storyline at just the right moment: during the deliberations of 
the interdepartmental working group for preparing NMP4. This instance adds 
credence to Hajer’s enabling interpretation of Foucault mentioned in section 2. 
Transitions advocates achieved policy influence through discursive strategies that 
sought affinities between storylines and built a broad-based coalition of support. 
 
The transitions approach was found to offer an open framework for sustainability 
activities. Breadth has furnished flexibility: transitions have been interpreted quite 
broadly. Rather than the ‘S’-curve symbolising the restructuring of entire socio-
technical systems, for example, it has been interpreted by some to mean the diffusion 
of specific low carbon technologies. The institutionalisation of the discourse restates 
the need for structural change, but fails to induce institutional change with sufficient 
reach and depth for the task. Rather, we have technology R&D policy repositioned   18
within a longer-term sustainability framework. The new arrangements do not provide 
the kind of reflexive fora and processes for discussing socio-cultural change and 
debate about industrial restructuring – though there is potential. Instead, we have 
technocratic attempts at sustainable technology development. 
 
The practice-oriented aspect of the discourse coalition framework is very careful to 
interpret institutions and interests through discourse, both of which have a powerful 
influence in this case study. Our analysis finds, however, that existing institutions and 
interests are narrowing and bending transitions discourse strongly in the short-term. 
They do this more than transitions discourse reconfigures institutions and shifts 
interests. So whilst discourse analysis has helped us understand why policy is being 
framed differently, it is existing interests and institutions (older discourses solidified) 
that form a powerfully restricting and attenuating point of passage for that new 
discourse. The discourse is downgraded and ecological modernisation still needs 
reinvigorating. 
 
The paradox that Hajer identified in ecological modernisation persists. The transitions 
discourse is failing to reinvigorate and radicalise ecological modernisation. As before, 
structural components diminish in the storyline. Overriding imperatives around 
economic performance and international competitiveness, embodied within the more 
powerful policy-making institutions of government, continue to trim ecological 
modernisation into a series of incremental reforms. Nevertheless, like earlier plans, 
but with a qualitative difference, the transitions approach creates space for continued 
debate over the possibilities of decoupling harmful ties between economies and 
environments and the adequacies of existing approaches. Included in this is a 
transitions research programme, whose critical reflection on transitions in practice, 




The transitions approach diverges from reflexive ecological modernisation by 
perpetuating technocratic, ‘how to’ exercises. Reflexivity demands the debate moves 
back to prior questions about social realities, social preferences and the framing of the 
environmental problem at hand. Expert opinion becomes contextualised and the 
contingencies of truth claims revealed through a less authoritative engagement with 
broader public argument. Dutch transitions policy is not there yet. Much has been 
achieved from the perspective of the processes EZ has set up for energy transitions: 
ambitious long-term visions; continuous learning and policy-research interaction; 
open engagement; and deliberation with stakeholders over further institutionalization 
of the transitions approach. One should not diminish the effort and innovation this has 
required on the part of policy-makers. From the perspective of a transition to 
sustainability, however, and decoupling economic growth from environmental 
degradation, then much work remains. At least there is an argumentative opportunity 
and entry point for more reflexive institutionalisation in the future, should such a 
movement emerge. 
 
In our view, deeper, more profound envisioning exercises and transitions debates will 
happen in civil society arenas, removed from the messy compromises of government 
                                                 
7 See, for example, the Competence Centre for Transitions: 
http://www.senternovem.nl/Competentiecentrum_transities/English.asp (accessed 19 April 2007)   19
and the economic imperatives of business. What the transitions discourse and 
ecological modernisation lack is an account of how such initiatives become a power 
base for change. Neither identifies the social agents that can ensure the radical 
components of a discourse are carried through to institutionalisation. 
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Table  1: Overview of transition platforms, pathways and experiments 
Platforms and their visions  Pathways  Experiments 
Chain Efficiency 
Environmental benefits can be achieved when producing goods, which demands the use of many 
different raw materials, uses a lot of energy and leads to emissions...Changing the energy structure 
can reduce CO2 emissions, conserve energy and materials use and reduce the environmental impact. 
Critically assessing production chains, from raw materials to end products, brings the largest 
savings. 
KE 1:  Renewal of 
production systems 
KE 2: sustainable paper 
chains 
KE 3: sustainable 
agricultural chains 
save 50% energy use along the production chain of paper by 2020 
Conversion of the MTBE (methanol tertiary butyl ether) production process to ETBE (ethanol 
tertiary butyl ether) based on bio-ethanol 
Bio-plastics: Breakthrough to self-sustaining growth 
 
Breakthrough for bio-plastics to high-value applications 
 
Green Resources 
The Netherlands should use raw materials more carefully. The total demand for energy, chemicals 
and materials in 2030 must be back to the 2000-level, by saving energy and recycling more 
materials and products. By 2030, the Platform foresees to replace 30% of fossil fuels…with bio-
based raw materials (biomass). And in 2030, bio-based raw materials must supply the following: 
60% of transport fuels; 25% of chemicals and materials; 17% of heating requirements; 25% of the 
electricity demand. The Platform realizes that the Netherlands has a limited agricultural area and 
that 60% - 80% of these needed bio-based raw materials will have to be imported to achieve the 
above goals. 
GG 1: biomass 
production 
GG 2: biomass import 
chain 
GG 3: Biosyngas 
GG 4: Bioplastics 
 
A factory for the production of bio-diesel from palm oil 
Buses on natural gas in Haarlem/Rijnmond  
 
Liquefied natural gas as a substitute for diesel 
 
CO2 delivery to greenhouses in horticulture sector (OCAP) 
Introduction of compressed natural gas as a mature car fuel in the North of the Netherlands 
Polder district in Zeewolde gets heating on biogas 
New Gas 
The energy transition in the natural gas sector means that the entire natural gas chain will become 
more sustainable. In recent years, in cooperation with interested parties, a portfolio of potentially 
promising routes has been identified that can provide direction and can be developed in parallel. 
They can be classified into two types: efficient use of gas, green and clean use of gas. The ET aims 
to sketch a long-term vision regarding the role of clean fossils in the Netherlands. This includes the 
significance and opportunities regarding CO2 storage (both on-shore and off-shore), due to the 
specific geological conditions of its substructure (oil and gas fields, aquifers, coal layers). 
EGG 1: Energy saving 
in the built environment 
EGG 2: Micro and mini 
CHP  
EGG 3: clean natural 
gas 
EGG 4:  Green gas 
EGG 5: energy saving 
greenhouse  Pilot project of micro generation in households 
Realisation of the hydrogen cart (Formula 0) 
A sustainable petrol station in the North of the Netherlands 
Sustainable Mobility 
The platform aims to speed up market introduction of sustainable fuels and vehicle technologies, 
with a focus on commercially viable options in the Netherlands in the next two to four years. 
AM 1: Natural gas  
AM 2: Biofuels 
 
A large-scale production facility for bio-diesel in Terneuzen 
Sustainable Electricity 
The transition has an ambitious but feasible and robust aim: a sustainable electricity provision that 
can be made virtually CO2 -free. The transition is so robust because the centralized production can 
deal flexibly with changing insights and market conditions. 
DE 1: Biomass 
DE 2: Wind 
 
 
Use of mine water for heating and cooling in Heerlerheide centre 
A good perspective can give an impetus for energy saving in council housing sector 
Heating in houses based on waste wood from pruning trees in Eindhoven 
heat transition in housing construction 
‘Geothermal heat for the whole Netherlands’ (heat pumps) 
Collective sustainable energy storage devices for heating and cooling 
Built Environment 
The total energy demand and CO2-emission from the use of a building is more important than the 
heat demands that are determined by the building design. Total energy demand is expected to rise 
approx 0.5% p.a., with a decline in natural gas use and a much stronger increase in electricity 
demand. Neighbourhood development is more important than single buildings. Key is the upgrading 
of the building stock and organisational and financing innovations to enable building owners to 
invest in their property. 
No pathways developed 
yet 
Sustainable heat and cooling through the use of heat pumps 
Sources: (Klinckenberg and Chobanova 2006), http://www.ez.nl/content.jsp?objectid=41052; http://www.senternovem.nl/eos/projecten/ukr/index.asp (accessed 18.07.06).  23
Tale 2: Participation in energy transition platforms 
Platform  Government Business NGOs  Intermediaries
8 Science  Total 
Green  Resources  1  6  1 1 6  15 
New  Gas  1  6  1 1 3  12 
Chain  Efficiency  1  6  0 1 3  11 
Sustainable 
Mobility  3 10  3 0 0  16 
Sustainable 
Electricity  1  3  0 0 3  7 
Built 
Environment  0  4  4 2 1  11 
Source: own compilation based on list of participants obtained from the secretaries of the platforms from 
SenterNovem 
                                                 
8 The category Intermediaries encompasses representatives from municipalities, SenterNovem (excluding the 
secretaries), the provinces, regional initiatives (such as Rijnmond) or national advisory boards such as SER. 